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The Truth About Property Rules: Some Obstacles to the
Economic Analysis of Remedies
Emily Sherwin*
Abstract
Property Rules, as famously described by Calabresi and
Melamed, are remedial rules that place a prohibitively high
penalty on violations of rights. This essay examines two aspects of
property rules. In each case, the form of the rule is critically
important. The first question addressed is the capacity of property
rules to affect behavior that takes place outside the context of
litigation. Most economic analysis assumes that when a right is
protected by a property rule, the property rule will guide private
decisionmaking at the time of a contemplated violation, and
possibly before that time. Yet, to have this effect, property rules
(and liability rules) must be embodied in a set of determinate legal
rules defining not only the penalty imposed on violation, but also
the entitlements protected and the conditions on which the
property-rule remedy is available. Property rules, in other words,
must be rules.
In fact, "true property rules" that meet this description are
scarce. This casts some doubt on the predictions made in literature
on the subject. Theory and doctrine may or may not be
reconcilable, depending on the desirability and feasibility of
determinate rules in the area of remedies.
In existing law, most true property rules protect property
rights. This leads to the second question addressed here: what
relationship, if any, do property rules bear to property? After
examining several theories others have proposed to explain the
association between property rules and property rights, I suggest
that property rules are connected to property in two ways. First,
deterrent property rules ensure the continuity that makes property
rights valuable to owners and to society. Second, once property
rights are securely in place, the value they generate makes
property rules a more efficient response to the possibility of
unilateral taking. To achieve these results, however, both property
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Greg Alexander, Eduardo
Pefialver, Henry Smith, and Christopher Wonnell for helpful comments.
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rights and property rules must be implemented by general,
determinate, and authoritative legal rules.
INTRODUCTION
Since Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed published
their seminal article on the subject in 1972,' economic analysis of
1 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). This
is one of the most widely and deeply cited articles of all times. See James E.
Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and
Impressions, 106 YALE L.J. 2121 (1997).
2 For a sampling of the literature inspired by Calabresi and Melamed's article,
see Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 269
(2004); Ian Ayres & Jack Balkin, Legal Entitlements As Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); lan Ayres & Paul
M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules,
32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2003) [hereinafter Ayres & Goldbart, Correlated
Values]; Ian Ayres & Paul Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the
Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Ayres &
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation]; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasian Trade, 104
YALE L. J. 1027 (1995); Lucian A Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability
Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001);
Richard R. W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 267
(2003); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Contract Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993);
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2005); Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability
Rules Once Again, 2 REVIEW OF EcoNoMics 137 (2006); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARv. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440
(1995); Saul Levmore, Unfying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149 (1997); Madeline Morris, The Structure of
Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1993); A Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling
Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and
Tax Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky,
Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics ofInjunctive and Damage
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest
Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541
(1998); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175
(1997); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property]; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property
Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004) [hereinafter Smith,
Exclusion].
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legal remedies has centered on the choice between "property rules"
and "liability rules" for protection of entitlements. Calabresi and
Melamed observed that a full description of any legal right entails
not only who possesses the right but how the right is enforced.2
Thus, in a case of industrial pollution, courts must choose not only
whether to assign the entitlement (to pollute or to be free from
pollution) to the factory or to homeowners, but whether to protect
the entitlement by means of an injunction, which gives practical
control to the entitlement holder, or with a damage remedy, which
allows the non-entitled party to take the entitlement for a court-
determined price.3
In this article, I will suggest that the economic notion of a
property rule relies on a critical assumption about the form of legal
rules governing remedies. Specifically, a property rule capable of
producing efficient outcomes must be embodied in a set of general,
determinate, and authoritative rules. In fact, rules governing
remedies tend to be at the low end of the continuum of legal
determinacy, although perhaps they should be more rule-like than
they are. This discrepancy between theory and practice places
economic analysis of remedies in some jeopardy.
A further mystery pertaining to property rules is what
relation, if any, they bear to what we typically think of as property
rights. Property rules are linked to property rights in at least some
economic analyses of remedial choice, yet the connection between
them has not been fully explored. I will suggest that, although
property rights and property rules are not coextensive, they have in
common a strong dependence on determinate legal rules.
I assume, as most writers have done, that maximizing the
value derived from resources is at least one of the objectives courts
should pursue in choosing among remedies.4 Depending on one's
political morality, a choice based on efficiency can then be
adjusted in response to distributive concerns or other deontological
requirements. I will say nothing in this essay about distributive
justice or the moral justifications for property rights; nor will I
embark on a technical economic analysis of legal methods for
enforcing rights. My aim is to examine the logical structure of the
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092, 1115-24.
4 See id. at 1093-94. 1 assume that efficiency is a valid normative objective for
law, even if it does not in itself express a moral standard. Efficiency is a goal
that morally sound political institutions can legitimately pursue. See Jody Kraus,
Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical
Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 302-03, 311-
313 (2007).
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problem of remedial choice, with emphasis on the connections
among property rules, property, and rules.5
I. PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES
A. Basic Definitions
The essential characteristic of what Calabresi and Melamed
called a property rule is that it effectively prevents deliberate
unilateral violations of the right it protects. Consequently, those
who wish to appropriate or otherwise interfere with the right must
seek the rightholder's consent. They must either bargain or abstain.
For simplicity, I will refer to violations of rights as
"takings," although the violation may consist of harm-invasion,
appropriation, or unauthorized use. Potential violators are
denominated "takers." Rightholders are "victims" (or, when
appropriate, "owners").
Property rules deter takings by imposing strong penalties,
such that no rational actor would choose to take without consent
and suffer the legal consequences. A property rule may take the
form of an injunction backed by contempt sanctions that negate
expected benefits from violating the right, a criminal prohibition
backed by similarly severe sanctions, an order for specific
restitution, or an order requiring the taker to disgorge any benefits
obtained.7 I shall have more to say in later sections about the
5 Thomas Merrill examined the role of determinate rules early in the debate over
property rules and liability rules. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance,
and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985). He
and Henry Smith have continued to pursue questions of legal form in property
law in a series of excellent articles. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerous Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal
Standardization]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, 101 COLuM. L. REV. 773 (2001) [hereinafter, Merrill & Smith,
Property/Contract]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359, 385-88, 394-979795
(2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Law & Economics]; Smith, Property, supra
note 2, at 1727-28; Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 973-74.
6 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092; Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 2, at 715.
7 Much of the literature focuses on injunctions, but the other remedies mentioned
in the text have similar deterrent effects. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 1, at 1124-26 (discussing property rule protection through criminal
sanctions); Epstein, supra note 2, at 2096-97 (discussing property rule protection
through specific restitution); Levmore, supra note 2, at 2156-57 (discussing
property rule protection through profit-based restitution).
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formal requirements for property rules.
A liability rule, in contrast, does not aim to prevent
unilateral rights violations. Instead, it re uires violators to pay a
court-determined price for what they take. With the price in mind,
potential takers may bargain, abstain, or proceed to take without
consent. Ideally, the price is calculated to ensure that would-be
takers will take if but only if the benefits to them exceed the cost to
their victims.9
B. Effects of Property Rules and Liability Rules
1. Efficient Allocation of Resources
For most writers who have addressed the subject of
property rules and liability rules, the primary motive in choosing
between them is to place whatever resources are at stake in the
hands of the party who values them most. The impact of remedial
choice on resource allocation has been and continues to be a
subject of intense debate. In their original discussion of property
rules and liability rules, Calabresi and Melamed surmised that
when the costs of bargaining are low, property rules are superior
because they encourage private bargaining, and bargaining is more
likely to produce an efficient allocation than forced exchange at an
officially determined price. When bargaining costs are high,
liability rules are superior because they permit exchanges to occur
at the designated price.
Subsequent writers have questioned and refined Calabresi's
and Melamed's conclusions. For example, James Krier and Stewart
Schwab draw attention to "assessment costs," meaning the
difficulties courts face in calculating values for the related risk of
error.10 When the costs of private bargaining are prohibitively
high, a property rule based on a mistaken assessment of the parties'
8 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092; Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 2, at 723-24.
9 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 724-28; A. Mitchell Polinski,
Resolving Nuisance Disputes, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075, 1101-02 (1980). For
varying proposals for calculating optimal liability rule prices when courts do not
have perfect information about the parties' subjective values, see, for example,
id. at 725-26 (defending liability rules based on average victim value); Ayres &
Goldbart, Correlated Values, supra note 2, at 134-39 (defending liability rules
based on a "conditional mean value" reflecting the point at which the taker's
value equal the mean probable value of victims, given a known correlation in
values).
1o Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 453-64; see also Polinski, supra note 9, at
1101-06 (concluding that neither property rules nor liability rules are generally
superior when courts have imperfect information about values).
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subjective valuations directly misallocates resources. A liability
rule that 'misjudges the value the victim places on the resources
results in too many or too few unilateral takings.
Others have argued that liability rules are generally
superior to property rules as tools for allocating disputed resources.
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley propose that when bargaining is
possible, liability rules facilitate agreement by splitting the right to
resources between parties; each party then has a reason to reveal
information about his or her private valuation." Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell show that when bargaining costs are high, liability
rules have the advantage of capturing private information. By
putting potential takers to a choice, liability rules make use of
takers' knowledge of their own valuations, which may otherwise
be inaccessible to the court. 12 It follows that, at least in the
paradigmatic nuisance case, a liability rule based on a rough
estimate of average victim value will be superior on average to a
property rule in favor of either the victim or the taker.13
Scholarly commentary has also produced a variety of
arguments in defense of property rules. Kaplow and Shavell, for
example, qualify their general conclusion in favor of liability rules
with the observation that property rules may be more efficient
when the taking consists of misappropriation of a physical thing.14
Henry Smith pursues a different line of argument, maintaining that
a regime of exclusionary property rights, backed by property rules,
is often the best way to generate and manage information about the
" See Ayres & Talley, supra note 2; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing
Between Consensual and Nonconsenual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105
YALE L.J. 235 (1995).
12 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 719-20, 724-28; see also Ayres &
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation, supra note 2 (proposing liability rules that
manipulate the locus of choice to maximize the use of private information);
Fennell, supra note 1 (proposing liability rules that require parties to generate
serial options).
Kaplow and Shavell do not claim that liability rules are superior in all
circumstances. They note that when bargaining costs are high but not
prohibitive, as when both parties lack information about the other's actual
valuation but know the average distribution of values among similarly situated
parties, neither property rules nor liability rules are systematically superior.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra, at 734-35. They also argue that property rules are
likely to be superior in the particular setting of appropriation of things, discussed
below. Id. at 721-23, 759-63.
" For this purpose, Kaplow and Shavell assume that although the estimate of
victim value may be rough, it is not systematically biased against victims.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 720, 730-31.
14 See id. at 721-23, 759-63.
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use of resources.' 5 I shall return to both these arguments later in
the essay, when I address the relationship between property rules
and property rights.
2. The Time-Frame Problem: Prospective Effects of
Remedial Choice
I take no position in the debate over the relative efficiency
of property rules and liability rules. My purpose in summarizing a
sample of the arguments made on this question is to highlight a
problem that sometimes has been overlooked: in order to assess the
impact of remedies on resource allocation, one must be clear about
the time frame in which they operate. On this point, the literature
on property rules and liability rules is surprisingly indistinct. Yet
the problem of time has significant implications for both the scope
of remedial theory and the form of remedial rules.
One possibility is to assess the effect of property rules and
liability rules at the time a court chooses between them. A
particular dispute has arisen, the parties are before the court, and
the question is how the court's choice of remedy, in this case, will
affect final placement of the resources at stake in the litigation. If
post-judgment bargaining is possible, the court's assignment of the
resources is open to further negotiation, and the choice between a
property rule and a liability rule may affect the chance of a
successful agreement. For example, as Ayres and Talley have
argued, a liability rule may raise the prospects for agreement by
encouraging the parties to reveal information.16 If post-judgment
bargaining is not feasible, the court's assignment of resources is
final and the choice of remedy has only distributive effects.
The court's choice of remedy in a particular case also
affects the administrative costs borne by the parties and the court.17
A liability rule requires a cardinal estimate of the value the victim
places on resources; a property rule requires an ordinal ranking of
is See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1753-90; Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2,
at 980. See also Epstein, supra note 2, at 2094-95 (emphasizing the risk of
undercompensation); Rose, supra note 2, at 2187 (suggesting that property rules
facilitate long-term planning); Hylton, supra note 2, at 140 (arguing that
property rules provide better protection for subjective values).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17See Brooks, supra note 2 (analyzing costs imposed on the court, independently
of errors resulting in misallocation of resources between parties), Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 1, at 1093 (citing administrative costs as a relevant
consideration); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 741 (discussing
administrative costs).
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both parties' valuations.' 8 One or the other of these measurements
may be more costly, depending on the setting.' 9 A liability rule
also may require the victim to reveal information he or she would
prefer to keep confidential. 20 A property rule may involve the court
in monitoring compliance after judgment. Costs of this kind
consume resources, even if they do not affect the final allocation
between parties.
A second possibility is to step back in time and ask what
impact a property rule or a liability rule may have on the initial
private decision whether to violate a right. Anticipating a property
rule, potential takers will not take (or will not engage in activities
likely to violate rights). Instead, would-be takers will either make
an offer or take no action. Anticipating a liability rule, potential
takers will either take, bargain, or do nothing, depending on the
price. From this perspective, the most important economic
consequences of remedial choice occur prior to, and outside the
context of, litigation.
The assumption that the choice of remedy affects behavior
at the point of taking greatly enlarges the scope of the inquiry.
Most obviously, the costs of bargaining at the time of taking are
now factors to consider in assessing the efficiency of different
rules. If pre-taking bargaining costs are low, then in theory the
parties can and will reach a correct allocation of resources on their
own, regardless of expected remedies. 2 Efficient exchanges will
occur and inefficient exchanges will not, without the intervention
of a court. If pre-taking bargaining costs are high, then the
expected remedy determines whether takings will occur.22 If takers
believe that courts will apply a property rule in favor of victims, or
a liability rule that fixes a price above the taker's value, there will
18 See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-70 (7th ed. 2007)
(noting that, given sufficient information, it is cheaper to compare the relative
values of both parties' uses than to determine the value of one victim's use). See
generally Russell Hardin, Rational Choice, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS
1062, 1063-64 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., New York;
London: Garland Publishing 1992) (discussing cardinal and ordinal utility
measurement).
19 See Brooks, supra note 2, at 277-96 (identifying variations in judicial
information that affect assessment costs under different rules).
20 Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa Bernstein have suggested that in contractual
disputes, measurement of the promisee's expectancy depends on information
about profits and value that, if public, could weaken the promisee's position in
subsequent dealings with the promisor and others. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa
Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 733-34.
22 See id. at 724.
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be no takings, although takers may sometimes place a higher value
on the resources more than victims. If takers believe that the court
will apply a property rule in favor of takers, or a liability rule that
fixes a price below the taker's value, the taking will occur,
although victims may place a higher value on the resources. There
may, in other words, be too many or too few takings, again with no
involvement by a court.
To complicate matters, the parties' remedial expectations
may affect the costs of pre-taking bargaining. For example, as
Kaplow and Shavell point out, a liability rule may force victims
who expect to suffer harm that exceeds the damages fixed by the
rule to bargain with multiple potential takers.2 3 In theory, when
damages are too low the victim can pay takers to refrain from
taking. The low price, however, may attract an indefinite number
of takers. If so, the owner cannot practically bargain to retain the
24
right, even if bargaining costs are otherwise insignificant.
When pre-taking bargaining costs are high, the costs of
judicial valuation, and the corresponding likelihood of judicial
error, must be added to the equation. If potential takers anticipate
23 See id. at 765-67. Kaplow and Shavell associate this problem with takings of
physical things. In a nuisance dispute between two neighbors, presumably the
owner can bargain with the taker; in a case of misappropriation, many would
find it rational to take advantage of an erroneously low liability rule. See id. at
766-67. Yet the problem may be more general.
There is an interesting parallel between the difficulty a victim faces in
bargaining out of multiple possible takings, and the reasons why the law is
property laws and markets are structured to permit owners to demand prices
from potential buyers, rather than requiring owners to pay for the benefit of
continued possession. See Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for
Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (1984).
24 Post-judgment bargaining costs may also be relevant, insofar as they affect the
final allocation of resources between parties whose pre-taking decisions are
shaped by the remedial rules. For example, suppose that an undercompensatory
liability rule leads to an inefficient taking, and pre-taking bargaining costs
prevent the victim from buying off the taker in advance. Suppose also that post-
judgment bargaining costs are lower, perhaps because the parties have obtained
better information about their respective valuations in the course of trial. The
victim may then be able to recover what was taken by offering an additional
payment. If so, the misallocation is thus correctable after the fact; and if this
pattern is predictable, the initial inefficiency of the liability rule is of less
concern. However, if post-judgment bargaining carries other costs that are likely
to prevent agreement, the defects of the liability rule cannot be cured.
This scenario assumes a manageable number of potential takers. If pre-
taking bargaining is costly because there are many potential takers, the owner is
unlikely to offer a post-judgment buy-off because the risk of further takings
would make the buy-off pointless. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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that courts will systematically misapply the governing rule, giving
property rule protection to the wrong party or fixing damages too
high or too low under a liability rule, they will adjust their
decisions accordingly. 2 5 The likelihood of error, in turn, depends
on the type of information available to the court in different
settings, as well as the governing remedial rule. If courts are likely
to have reliable information about the distribution of victim
valuations but not about the actual valuations of particular parties,
then, as Kaplow and Shavell point out, liability rules will normally
perform better on average than property rules because they make
use of takers' private knowledge. 6 If courts are likely to have
access to information about actual valuations, the ordinal
calculation associated with property rules may be simpler, and
therefore more accurate, than the cardinal estimate of victim value
needed for a liability rule.2 7
Administrative and other costs associated with property
rules and liability rules can also affect decisionmaking at the point
of taking. A rule that imposes high costs on victims in case of
litigation weakens a victim's bargaining position at the time of
taking because the victim's threat to sue is less credible. Similarly,
if litigation under the governing rule will require one party to
disclose information he or she would prefer to keep private, and
both parties know this, bargaining positions at the time of taking
will reflect the costs of disclosure.
Finally, analysis of property rules and liability rules can be
extended to even earlier points in time, when the parties choose
among possible uses of resources.29 Anticipating that particular
25 Kaplow and Shavell note that if courts systematically underestimate damages,
it is no longer fair to assume that liability rules are more reliable. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 2, at 730-31. There is ample reason to think that damages
are often undercompensatory. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Compensation and
Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389-96 (2003); Jeffrey Standen, The
Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 145 (1995).26 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
27 See Brooks, supra note 2, at 279 (noting that judges generally "have some
knowledge of the specific parties' valuations").
28 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
29 Lucien Bebchuk undertakes this task, analyzing how the anticipated division
of surplus in what he refers to as "ex post" bargaining may affect incentives for
initial investment in productive activity and in measures to prevent harmful
takings. Lucien Ayre Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex
Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REv. 601 (2001). By ex post
bargaining, Bebchuk appears to mean any bargaining that occurs after the parties
have chosen and invested in activities, including both post-judgment and pre-
taking bargaining. Given Bebchuk's assumption of perfect bargaining
[March48
The Truth About Property Rules
activities may ultimately conflict, that the conflict may be resolved
in court, and that the court will choose a property rule or a liability
rule, parties will structure their investments accordingly. If the
costs of later bargaining are high, the expected rule will guide
investment; if bargaining costs are low, investment decisions will
be influenced by the effects of the governing rule on the division of
bargaining surplus.o Parties may also take into account the
different methods of assessing value courts are likely use under
property rules or liability rules in the event of litigation over
conflicting uses, and adjust their activities in ways they hope will
affect valuation.31
3. Prospectivity and Rules
Whatever specific conclusions one may draw about how
property rules and liability rules operate under varying conditions,
the economic significance of the choice between them depends on
the extent to which the choice is prospective in effect. Not
surprisingly, most writing on the subject takes as a premise that the
effects of remedial choice extend at least to the point of taking and
perhaps even further back in time. Yet very little attention has been
paid to the form that property rules and liability rules must take to
support this premise.
Choice among legal remedies can proceed in two ways:
courts can select remedies case-by-case at the conclusion of trial,
or lawmakers (courts or legislatures) can select remedies for
classes of cases in advance of litigation, by means of remedial
rules. Particularistic remedial choices affect only post-litigation
behavior and administrative costs. Therefore, any analysis of
property rules and liability rules that attributes broader effects to
the choice of remedies necessarily assumes the existence of
property rule rules and liability rule rules. It assumes, in other
words, that remedial choices by courts or other lawmakers meet
three formal criteria. They must be general, meaning that they
conditions, the timing of the ex post bargain is not significant. Bebchuk
concludes that when bargaining is possible, different remedies (and different
entitlements) will elicit mixed combinations of behavior by the parties,
depending on context.
30 See id. at 612-34 (assuming perfect bargaining conditions and examining the
"ex ante" effects of the expected division of surplus under property rules or
liability rules) (emphasis added).
31 See Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal
Rules, 67 U. CHi. L. REV. 685-96 (2002) (suggesting that under liability rules,
parties may respond strategically to the prospect of qualitative assessment of
value by altering features of the subject matter that serve as proxies for value).
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apply to classes of future cases. They must be determinate,
meaning that the terms in which they are expressed can be
understood and applied by future courts without recourse to
contestable moral standards. They must also be treated as
authoritative by future courts. Only then can remedial choices
operate as rules.3 2
This is a simple point, but it leads to considerably more
restrictive definitions of property rules and liability rules than
commonly appear in the literature. Suppose, for example, that the
best rule for a certain class of cases is a property rule in favor of
victims (or, more precisely, a property rule rule in favor of
victims). The function of a property rule is to prevent unilateral
takings. If the rule is to perform this function prior to, and outside,
litigation, the law must first define both the victim's substantive
entitlement and the choice of remedy in determinate terms.
It follows that a right that depends on a balance of interests
in context cannot effectively be protected by a litigation-
independent property rule. For example, the Restatement of Torts
defines nuisance as an unreasonable interference with enjoyment
of land and reasonableness as a function of the private and societal
interests at stake.3 3  When this definition prevails, even a clear
property rule, providing for routine injunctive relief, will not fully
deter activities that might qualify as nuisances. 34
Assuming a determinate entitlement, the conditions under
which courts will grant a deterrent remedy-that is, the criteria for
selection of a property rule rather a liability rule-must also be
defined in determinate terms. If injunctive relief for an
acknowledged nuisance depends on the social value of the
defendant's activity or other criteria on which courts are likely to
disagree, nuisances may still occur. The remedial rule must also
provide for sanctions that negate any benefits a taker might obtain
by violating the right, and the sanctions must follow automatically
32 For an excellent discussion of the nature, requisites, and advantages of
authoritative rules, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LIFE AND
LAW (1991). See also LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF
RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 26-36 (2001)
(discussing the characteristics of authoritative rules).
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
34See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826 (1979) (comparing gravity
of harm to utility of conduct). But of Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 993,
997-1005, 1024 (arguing that nuisance law often relies on simple rules of
exclusion).
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whenever the criteria for application of the rule are met.3 5 A degree
of uncertainty about the level of expected sanctions will not
necessarily undermine the deterrent effect of the rule, as long as
takers face a distribution of expected penalties in which the
average penalty is equal to the takers' expected benefit. Yet, the
choice between a deterrent property rule and a non-deterrent
liability rule must be clear: remedial standards that leave the choice
of remedy uncertain have neither the protective effects of property
rules nor the pricing effects of accurate liability rules.
Finally, the rule must be announced as a rule by an
authority whose decisions courts accept as binding in all cases. If
the source of the rule is a court, the court's decisions on remedial
questions must have the status of authoritative precedent rules.36
To the extent that future courts treat prior decisions as examples or
rules of thumb, prior decisions do not establish property rules.
Thus, a property rule capable of operating in advance of
litigation-what I will call a true property rule-must instruct
future courts to apply fully deterrent sanctions, under determinate
conditions, for protection of a clearly defined class of entitlements,
without further consideration of the specifics of the case at hand.
Liability rules are subject to similar constraints, if they are
intended to affect pre-litigation decisionmaking directly. 3  The
entitlement must be defined and assigned in determinate terms; the
choice of remedy must be specified for an ascertainable class of
cases; and the price must be fixed for all cases to which the rule
applies. The price may refer to a probability distribution, such as
average victim value, but the formula for calculating prices in
35 See Hylton, supra note 2, at 178-83 (arguing that a property rule must fix a
price equal to the greater of the taker's valuation or the victim's subjective
valuation, in order to fully protect subjective values).
The question what sanctions are necessary to deter takings is
complicated by imperfections in the process of enforcement including, most
obviously, the probability that not all victims will sue. See, e.g., A. Mitchell
Polinksy & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and
Magnitude ofFines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979).
36 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 140-42 (discussing the "rule
model" of precedent); see also Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 62
S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 17-28 (same).
3 Indeterminate liability rules, or for that matter indeterminate legal standards of
any kind, may affect private bargaining. See Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining
Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG 256 (1995) (suggesting
that, under certain conditions, bargaining is enhanced by vaguely defined
entitlements). Indeterminate standards, however, will not direct resource
allocation in the manner contemplated in most literature on property rules and
liability rules.
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particular cases must be determinate.
In fact, true property rules are rather scarce. The remedy
most typically associated with property-rule protection for
entitlements is an injunction, backed by the threat of sanctions for
contempt. Injunctions, however, are historically equitable
remedies, subject to discretionary control by the issuing court.3 9 in
a few categories of cases, courts routinely grant injunctions; more
typically, however, the choice between damages and an injunction
is a fact-specific decision, based on considerations such as
propensity to act, probability of harm, and the likelihood that
damages will provide fair compensation if harm occurs. 4 0
Injunctions are also subject to "equitable defenses" that refer to
vague principles of morality and fairness, such as "unclean hands"
or "disproportionate hardship." 4 1
Punitive damages, available in civil proceedings, may
contribute to deterrence.42 Yet the law provides very little guidance
on either the availability of punitive damages in particular contexts
or the measure of punitive damages when they apply. 43 Thus, at
38 See supra text accompanying note 13.
3 See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-
EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 1.2 at 12, § 2.1(2) at 59, § 2.4(1) at 90-91 (2d ed. 1993).
4 See generally id.; DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 233-
57(3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAYCOCK, REMEDIES]. Laycock has demonstrated
through extensive research that courts rarely rely on the supposed requirement
of "irreparable injury" (or "inadequacy" of legal remedies) as an independent
reason to deny injunctive relief. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULES (1991). This is not to say, however, that they grant
injunctions routinely, without evaluating the impact of the remedy in the context
of a particular dispute.
Moreover, courts grant both preliminary injunctions, at the outset of
litigation, and permanent injunctions, after trial, applying different standards that
reflect the degree of factual uncertainty at different stages of adjudication. See 1
DOBBS, supra note 39, at § 2.11(1) at 249-50; LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra, at
440-77.
41 See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 2.4(1) at 91; § 2.4(2) at 92-99, §
2.4(5) at 108-113.
42 See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 3.11(1) at 452-57; LAYCOCK,
REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 719-38.
43 In an effort to control punitive damages, the United States Supreme Court has
recently suggested that the Constitution may require a degree proportionality
between compensatory and punitive remedies. See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003);
Phillip Morris USA v. William, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Yet even the rather loose
restrictions proposed by the Court have met with resistance from state courts and
lower federal courts. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 98
P.3d 409 (Utah 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874 (2004) (awarding the
maximum amount approved by the Supreme Court); Mathias v. Accor Econ.
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least for parties who do not expect to litigate repeatedly over harms
arising from a single activity, the prospect of punitive damages is
unlikely to operate as a true property rule.4
A more promising form of property rule is restitution of
profits. 4 5 By definition, a remedy that allows victims to claim their
injurers' full profits is an effective deterrent because it eliminates
potential gains from taking, including economic gains in the form
of saved costs. 46 Moreover, the criteria for profit-based restitution
are relatively clear: for particular categories of wrongdoing, such
as misappropriation of another's assets, conscious wrongdoers are
routinely required to account for profits.47 Yet full disgorgement of
profits is a fairly limited remedy, which does not apply to all forms
of deliberate or reckless wrongs. Notably, restitution of profits (or
Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding special circumstances).
4 A manufacturer expecting multiple products liability suits may calculate and
respond to the statistical probability of punitive damages. See Baker v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998) (in which General Motors attempted to block
testimony by a former employee in the wake of large punitive damage awards
against auto manufacturers).
There are substantial questions about the desirability of effective
property rules in the context of products liability. Despite occasional awards of
significant punitive damages, there probably is no social consensus in favor of
deterring commercial activities that carry known risks of serious harm. For
discussion of the problem, see LAYCOCK, REMEDIES supra note 40, at 598-600,
729-30 (addressing disgorgement of profits and punitive damages, respectively).
45 Douglas Laycock helpfully refers to profit-based restitution as restitution of
"consequential gains." LAYCOCK, REMEDIES supra note 40, at 575. The draft
Restatement adopts the same term. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 53(3) (Tentative Draft No. 5 2007). See also 1 DOBBS,
supra note 39, § 4.5(3) at 637-41.
46 See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
40(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); § 51(3), cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5,
2007); LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 585. Innocent wrongdoers
normally are not liable for profits. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 45, § 40(2)(b); LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra
note 40, at 585 (noting an exception in the case of copyright infringement).
There are also cases iii which the criteria for disgorgement are far from
clear, notably constructive trusts imposed on grounds such as breach of fiduciary
duty and undue influence, or, on simply on the basis of unjust enrichment. See,
e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (imposing a constructive trust
on a former CIA agent for breach of fiduciary duties arising from a contractual
obligation to submit proposed publications to the agency for review); Sharp v.
Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1976) (imposing a constructive trust on the
plaintiff's former cohabitant for breach of fiduciary duties implicit in the parties'
relationship). Deterrent remedies in cases of this kind do not operate as true
property rules because they are not embodied in rules.
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saved costs) is not ordinarily available for breach of contract48 or
for injuries caused by defective products.49
Another possible source of deterrence is the criminal law.5
The conditions for imposing criminal punishment and the extent of
the penalty typically are specified in advance by legislation. As a
consequence, criminal penalties can operate as true property rules,
if the probable penalty is severe enough to negate the benefits of
unilateral taking. Criminal laws, however, do not cover all forms
of rights violation, and the penalties they impose for mundane
takings may be inadequate to deter.5 1
Many, though not all, of the instances in which the law
approaches true property rule protection involve property rights.
Property rights tend to be relatively determinate, and remedial
rules provide for deterrent remedies for violation of property rights
in relatively well-defined circumstances. Thus, as noted, profit-
based restitution is a standard remedy for intentional
misappropriation of property. 52  Similarly, injunctions are
presumptively available in cases of repeated trespass to land, 3
interference with easements, 54 misappropriation of intellectual
property,55 and breach of contracts for sale of land.56
The correspondence between property rights and true
property rules is far from Perfect. Not all property rights are
protected by property rules,5 and rules that call for property rule
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (1981); 1 DOBBS, supra
note 39, § 4.5(3) at 644-45. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (recognizing a claim to
profits from "opportunistic breach); LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at
600-03 (noting some exceptions to the general rule).
49 See LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 599.
'o See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1124-27.
5' See, e.g., Jacque v. Sternberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wisc. 1997) (noting
that defendants were fined $30 for trespassing on the plaintiffs land) ; see also
infra note 58 and accompanying text.
52 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
40(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); see also supra note 45 and
accompanying text. Some intellectual property statutes provide for restitution of
profits, other do not; however, the statutes give courts considerable discretion in
awarding profits. See generally 2 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 6.2(1) at 41, § 6.3(4)
at 59; § 6.4(4) at 87-80; LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 584-85.
s3 See I DOBBS, supra note 39, § 5.10(3) at 809.
54 See id. § 5.7(6) at 785.
s See 2 id. § 6.2(5) at 43-44; § 6.3(5) at 64-65; § 6.4(5) at 95-96.
6 See 3 id. § 12.11(3) at 299-300.
1 One significant exception is accident cases: when a legal thing is inadvertently
invaded or destroyed, deterrence is not possible and courts must resort to
liability rules. By their nature, however, accidents are beyond the reach of any
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protection apainst violation property rights are seldom perfectly
determinate. 8 Nevertheless, reasonably reliable deterrent remedies
are more common in the field of property than in other areas of
law. I shall return later to the association between true property
rules and property rights.
As an illustration of the elusiveness of true property rules,
even when property rights are at stake, consider Jacque v.
Sternberg Homes.59 Sternberg sought permission to cross the
plaintiffs' land to deliver a mobile home after a snowstorm made
normal routes impassible. When the Jacques refused, the defendant
proceeded to cross their land. A jury ultimately held Sternberg
liable for nominal damages of $1 and punitive dama es of
$100,000, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved. This
case may appear to establish true property rule protection against
unauthorized crossing of the boundaries of private land. In fact,
however, the award of punitive damages depended on the jury's
conception of egregious conduct, and other deterrent remedies
theory about the prospective effects of remedial choice.
There are also instances in which property rule protection is possible,
but courts decline to use it. For example, traditional rules hold that profit-based
restitution is not available when a trespasser enters land without consent and
profits from the entry, but leaves the land intact. See I id. § 5.9, at 800-02. The
draft Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment adopts the contrary
view, allowing recovery of profits. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40(2)(a), cmt. c, illus. 4 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
See also Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 W.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936) (allowing
recovery of profits from use of a cave under the plaintiffs land). The remedy
recognized by the Restatement, however, may not qualify as a true property rule;
the comments refer to remoteness of profits and the "equitable positions of the
parties" as possible qualifications, even when the defendant is a conscious
wrongdoer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 40(2)(a), cmt. c, illus. 4, 7.
Another example is fungible goods. When a defendant misappropriates
fungible property and "confuses" it with similar property of the defendant,
courts are likely to limit the remedy to damages, rather than allow the plaintiff to
recover the commingled mass, even when the taking was deliberate. See, e.g.,
Somer v. Kane, 210 N.W. 287 (Minn. 1926) (denying replevin of commingled
logs). Similarly, when a defendant breaches a contract to deliver fungible goods,
courts typically refuse to grant specific performance (or replevin) and instead
limit the buyer's remedy to damages. See U.C.C. § 2-716(1), (3).
58 Injunctive relief, in particular, is always subject to the defense of
disproportionate hardship, even in categories of cases in which injunctions are
otherwise the preferred method of enforcement. See, e.g., Van Wagner Advert.
Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E. 756 (N.Y. 1986) (denying specific
Ferformance).
9 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wisc. 1997).
60Id. at 166 (reinstating the jury's verdict).
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were unlikely to apply. To obtain an injunction in advance, the
Jacques would need to know of Sternberg's plans, and to prove
both Sternberg's propensity to act and the comparative inadequacy
of damages. Profit-based restitution probably was not a viable
option, due to the difficulty of establishing the defendant's saved
costs. 6 1 The criminal penalty for trespass was $30. Thus, even in
the core case of entry onto private land, property rule protection
may not be sufficiently certain and thorough to deter a unilateral
- * 62
violation of rights.
4. Implications for Economic Analysis
As administered by courts, property rules and liability rules
often do not operate as rules. The paradigmatic property rule-an
injunction-is a case-specific remedy, which is not easily
predictable in advance of litigation. Standards for awarding for
punitive damages are similarly indeterminate. Other potential
property rules are more determinate in application but are limited
in scope. Under current legal standards, therefore, the choice
between property rule protection and liability rule protection for
entitlements is most often a retrospective choice at the conclusion
of litigation, the effects of which are limited to administrative costs
and post-litigation decisionmaking by the particular parties
involved.
As a result, much of the existing economic analysis of
property rules and liability rules suffers to some extent, and
possibly to a significant extent, from a descriptive mismatch with
the law. Under existing remedial rules, private parties may be able
to make a rough prediction of remedial probabilities. Still, the
uncertainties of judicial practice in the area of remedies suggest
that the impact of remedial choice on private decisionmaking may
be considerably more modest than commentators have assumed.
One feature of the law of remedies may ameliorate the
descriptive problem. The set of legal rules familiar to the public is
not always the same as the set of rules that actually governs
judicial decisionmaking.63 As a result, private decisionmakers may
61 The Jacques' claim might also fail under the traditional rule that profit-based
restitution is not available for trespass that causes no harm. See supra note 55.
62 Of course, Sternberg is unlikely to try this again.
63 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 88 (discussing strategies of
public deception to encourage conformity to rules); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 625, 630-36 (1984) (discussing "selective transmission" of legal rules in
the criminal law); Emily Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50
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expect to be governed by a somewhat different, and more clear-cut,
set of remedial rules than courts would actually apply in litigation.
For example, an actor with some awareness of law may understand
that it is unlawful to enter another's land without consent, that
violators are subject to criminal penalties, and possibly that
continuing violations will be enjoined. But only those with
significant legal experience are likely to know the amount of the
penalty for criminal trespass, or to understand that a court
adjudicating a trespass case will compare the efficacy of damages
and weigh hardships before granting an injunction. Accordingly,
potential trespassers who fall into the first category (some
awareness) may choose their course of action as if a true property
rule were in place. Gaps of this kind, between the "conduct rules"
on which people act and the "decision rules" applied by judges,6
are particularly likely to arise in the area of remedies, in which
presumptive rules are often subject to arcane exceptions or judicial
discretion. As a result, the actual prospective effect of property
rules may be greater than the law of remedies might suggest.
Yet, the possibility that popular understanding of remedial
rules may diverge from judicial application of remedial rules does
not eliminate the descriptive mismatch between economic analysis
of remedies and the practices of courts. The impact of popular
understandings of law on decisionmaking is difficult if not
impossible to assess, and in any event the rules applied by courts
are accessible to those who receive competent legal advice.
Moreover, popular understandings that diverge from judicial
decision rules are inherently unstable: if decision rules come to
light, popular understandings, and any expectations they may have
generated, have no further effect. 65
If economic analysis of remedies fails as a matter of
descriptive accuracy, it may nevertheless succeed on a normative
basis. Current remedies doctrine may be too indeterminate to guide
private decisionmaking in advance of litigation. But if remedies are
capable in theory of generating efficient decisions, this may be a
reason to adopt more determinate remedial rules.
The normative case for reforming remedies doctrine to
accommodate economic insights depends in part on the general
MD. L. REv. 253, 263-64 (1991) (noting similar patterns in contract
enforcement). See also GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 403, 448-52 (1986) (discussing Bentham's theory of adjudication).
6 These are Meir Dan-Cohen's terms. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 63.
65 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 89 (discussing the dangers of
public deception).
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desirability of determinate rules in this area of law. Determinate
rules provide guidance, coordination, and potentially beneficial
incentives at the cost of underinclusiveness and
overinclusiveness.66 Because rules apply to classes of cases, a
certain percentage of the outcomes prescribed by any rule will be
mistaken when judged by the reasons underlying the rule.67 If the
benefits of the rule-in this case, more efficient private decisions-
-exceed the costs resulting from mistaken outcomes, the rule is
sound and mistakes must be tolerated to preserve the integrity of
the rule. If not, the rule is not a justified rule. Accordingly, the
question to be asked, with respect to any proposed remedial rule, is
whether a determinate rule will generate efficiency gains that
exceed whatever losses in efficiency, or costs of other kinds, result
from the bluntness of the rule.68
The literature on property rules and liability rules has
yielded a number of sophisticated proposals for rules designed to
maximize efficiency gains by forcing parties to reveal private
information.69 Insights of this kind may limit the errors caused by
overly blunt remedial rules. At some point, however, a rule may
fail to provide effective guidance, not because it lacks determinacy
but because it is too complex for private actors to understand and
apply. 0
The unavoidable bluntness of rules also complicates the
requirement that if remedial rules are to influence pre-litigation
decisionmaking, they must be accepted as authoritative by future
courts. From an economic standpoint, the errors that accompany
determinate rules are simply costs that must be balanced against
the benefits of remedial rules capable of eliciting efficient private
66 For a full discussion of the benefits of rules, see Schauer, supra note 32, at 77-
134. On the value of coordination, see, for example, JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 49-50 (1986); SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 162-66;
Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundation ofLaw, 11
J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 172-86 (1982); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value:
Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1006-10
989).
See SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 31-34, 48-54.
68 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 54 (discussing the dilemma of
rules); RAZ, supra note 66, at 70-80 (discussing the "normal justification" of
rules).
69 See, e.g., Ayres & Goldbart, Optimal Delegation, supra note 2, at 16-61;
Ayres & Goldbart, Correlated Values, supra note 2, at 134-47; Fennell, supra
note 2, at 1433-44; Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 470-75; Morris, supra note
2, at 849-75.
70 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 32-34 (noting that rules that
rely on objective criteria may nevertheless be indeterminate).
[March58
The Truth About Property Rules
decisions. Judges, however, may find it irrational to follow a rule
that prescribes an inefficient or unjust result in a particular case.7 1
Even for judges who appreciate the value of rules, the concrete
facts of the case at hand may have a psychological salience that
overshadows the comparatively remote economic benefits of
reliable rules.72 Public dissatisfaction with bad outcomes in
individual may also prompt judges to deviate from rules. If, in
response to these pressures, judges regularly make exceptions in
recalcitrant cases, the rules will be less reliable and consequently
will have less effect on private decisionmaking.
If judges are unable to comply with determinate remedial
rules, or if the costs of determinate rules exceed their allocative
benefits, the project of eliciting efficient private decisions through
remedial choice is not viable. At the same time, the current
indeterminacy of remedial rules does not necessarily indicate that
greater determinacy is undesirable or unfeasible. The path
dependency of the common law, and the odd historical influence of
the English Chancery court on the development of remedies
doctrine, can easily explain why more determinate remedial rules
have not evolved. 3 The normative question, therefore, remains
open.
II. PROPERTY
To recap: the economic significance of the choice between
property rules and liability rules as means of protecting
entitlements is far greater when legal remedies take the form of
rules. If a property rule is simply the remedial outcome of a
particular litigation, its effects are necessarily limited to the costs it
71 On the rationality of judicial adherence to rules, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN,
supra note 32, at 77-86; HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 62-94 (1999).
72 Behavioral psychologists have noted that readily "available" facts tend to have
a disproportionate influence on human decisionmaking, at the expense of
background probabilities. See, e.g., AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequence and Probability, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus
Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 933 (2006); Norbert Schwarz &
Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and
Content of Recall as Distinct Source of Information, in HEURISTICS & BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUTrIVE JUDGMENT 103 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin
& Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); SCOTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121-30 (1993).
1 See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 1.2, at 55-66.
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imposes on the parties and the court and the incentives or
impediments it creates for post-litigation bargaining. To shape
private decisionmaking at or before the time of taking, without
judicial intervention, a property rule must be established by
determinate legal rules that define the entitlement to be protected,
the conditions on which the property-rule remedy is available, and
the extent of the sanction it imposes on takers.
In the sections that follow I shall assume that it is possible
to create property rules in this form and that the errors likely to
result from blunt remedial rules are not prohibitive. The question I
address here is whether there is any logical connection between
property-rule rules and property rights.
A. Property Rights
The first step in examining the relationship between
property rules and property rights is to explain what makes a right
a property right. In this section, I set out my own views on the
subject.74 I begin, however, with the account of property rights
developed by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, which has much
in common with, and has contributed to, my own understanding of
property. 75
Merrill and Smith defend a traditional definition of
property rights as in rem rights with respect to things.7 6 Property
rights are standardized rights of control over resources, held by an
indefinite class of rightholders and binding on an indefinite class of
dutyholders. Rather than attaching directly to rightholders as
personal rights, they attach by virtue of the rightholder's legal
relationship to a thing-the relationship of ownership.
Property rights, understood as in rem rights over things,
74 I have attempted in previous writings to define the essential characteristics of
property rights, never with complete success. See Emily Sherwin, Three
Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1927, 1928-33 (2007); Emily Sherwin, Two-and Three-
Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARiZ. L. REV. 1075, 1077-80 (1997).
7 Merrill and Smith have elaborated their theory in a series of articles including,
among others. See Merrill, supra note 5; Merrill & Smith, Optimal
Standardization, supra note 5; Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note
5; Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 5; Smith, Property, supra
note 2; Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2.
76 See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 780-89; Merrill &
Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 357-66, 385-94.
7 See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 783-89. Merrill &
Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 358-60. Merrill and Smith suggest
that, while property rights are inherently in rem, not all in rem rights are
property rights. See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 778.
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have several distinguishing features. First, they take a limited
number of forms, defined in simple terms that can easily be
understood by owners and dutyholders. 7 8 Second, they establish a
regime of "exclusion:" the rules of ownership give owners the right
to exclude third parties from the things they own. The right to
exclude others from a thing has the effect of "bundling" together
different uses of resources. In contrast to a "governance" regime,
in which legal rules identify and regulate particular resource uses
that may conflict, a regime of exclusion allows the owner of a
thing to choose among a range of possible resource uses
encompassed by the thing.so
Merrill and Smith are primarily concerned with efficient
use of resources. In particular, they argue that exclusionary
property rights contribute to efficiency by reducing the costs
associated with gathering and marshaling information about
resources. Rules that assign rights over a simply defined thing
make it easy for the indefinite class of duty holders to understand
their legal positions, and thus to acquire, or to abstain from taking,
the resources in question.8' Further, by delegating the choice
among uses to a designated owner, exclusionary property rights
avoid the need for legal officials to distinguish among and rank
82
specific uses of resources. Courts (or other legal officials) make
only the "second-order" decision to delegate, leaving more costX3
"first-order" decisions about which use is best to the owner.
Rights of this kind reduce the cost of information because the
owner is ordinarily in a better position than officials to gather
information about resource use. The owner is closer to the
resources, and the owner is in a position to postpone
decisionmaking and take advantage of future opportunities.
78 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 5.
7 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 978-84, 1728, 1759-60.
so See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 1722-24; Smith, Property, supra note 2,
at 1754-63.
81 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 5, at 26-34; Merrill
& Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 794.
82 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1755-61, Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2,
at 981-84.
83 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1760-61, Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2,
at 975, 984.
84 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 985 (suggesting that owners are
normally "the least-cost generators of information about assets" because they are
close to the assets and receive offers from potential purchasers); Smith,
Property, supra note 2, at 1763 (noting that the optimal time for valuing
resources may be in the future).
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Thus, for Merrill and Smith, information cost benefits
explain and justify rights of exclusion, which are the essence of
property. In Smith's words, "the traditional intuitions that property
rules afford stability of expectations, permit planning, and allow
owners to invest in assets are incompletely theorized versions of'
the information cost argument for exclusionary property rights.s
At the same time, Merrill and Smith also recognized that
exclusionary property rights are not always adequate to bring about
efficient resource use. When the value of resources can be
increased by allowing multiple parties to make use of indivisible
assets, the law may shift to a governance regime in which specific
uses are regulated by contract or directly by courts or
legislatures.
My own account of property also tracks the traditional
notion of property rights as rights of control over things. For
present purposes, my concern is with legal property rights, created
by lawmaking authorities to serve various social ends." One
important objective of legal property rights is to maximize the
value of scarce resources by giving individuals the means and
incentives necessary for productive activity. At minimum, a
8 Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1784.
86 See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 790-99 (discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of a regime of exclusion); Smith, Exclusion,
supra note 2, at 981-82; 1024-45 (discussing conditions favoring governance
rules). Smith does not make clear whether rights created by a governance regime
for resources should also count as "property" rights. In the discussion that
follows I assume that they do not.
87 Private property may or may not have deontological moral foundations. I set
this question aside for the purpose of analyzing legal rights. For discussion of
the moral aspects of private property rights, see generally, LAWRENCE C.
BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); STEPHEN R.
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 292-314 (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, THE
RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
88 See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 87, at 57-74; Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of
Legislation, chs. VII-VIII (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931); John Stuart Mill,
Utilitarianism ch. V (Oskar Piest ed., 1957); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347, 356-57 (1967). Legal property
rights are consequentially related to several important ends of a liberal society.
They contribute to welfare by supporting productivity, and they contribute to
political freedom (which can be viewed either as a good in itself or a further
building block for general welfare) by providing individuals with economic
independence from government. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 87, at 75-80;
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962). At the same time,
property rights may also contribute in various ways to the maintenance of bonds
between individuals and the community. See, e.g., EDUARDO M. PERALVER, THE
PROBLEM WITH LAND (forthcoming) (discussing various values landowners
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property right capable of performing this function requires an
ascertainable legal thing and an assignment of the thing to an
ascertainable legal owner. The medium for creation of property
rights is language: to define the objects of property rights (legal
things) and assign them to owners, the law relies on rules that are
determinate enough to be understood and applied by private parties
who may be interested in the resources at stake.
Objects of property may be physical things recognized by
law as the subject matter of property rights, or they may be
conceptual things that exist only by virtue of the rules that define
them, if their conceptual contours are clear. They are "things" in
the sense that they are broader than, and exist independently of,
particular activities in which the owner may engage or particular
benefits the owner hopes to derive from their use. The legal things
that form the basis of property rights are subjects of enterprise and
choice by owners, which the owner can act on in various ways.
This is another way of stating the point made by Merrill and Smith,
89that property rights "bundle" potential uses of valuable resources.
Objects of property include, for example, possessory
interests in land or chattels; future interests; defined intangibles
such as mortgages, patents, and copyrights; easements that allow
the holder a range of use rights within a defined area of the
servient owner's land; and contract rights calling for future transfer
of a legal thing under defined conditions. The component parts of
one's body are, potentially, objects of property, although current
law is ambivalent about assigning the right of ownership. 90 What
these various legal things have in common is that they provide
objectively defined arenas for value-producing activity and choice.
Ownership is control of a legal thing. The law assigns
objects of property to identifiable owners, and thus delegates to
owners the choice among potential resource uses. As Merrill and
Smith observe, the rules of property do not identify all possible
uses of legal things and designate them as permissible or
impermissible by owners. Instead, owners are permitted to make
whatever uses of the legal things assigned to them are not
otherwise prohibited by law. Ownership is, in effect, a range of
choice about what to do with a legal thing.91
derive from their property, including membership in a community).
8 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487-97 (Cal.
1990) (refusing to recognize a property right in cell lines derived from cells
removed from the plaintiff's spleen).
9'1 do not mean to deny that legal ownership may carry responsibilities. Within
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Determinacy is a fundamental characteristic of property
rights. 92 To permit private parties to make effective use of
resources, the rules that define objects of property and assign them
to owners must operate outside and prior to adjudication of
particular conflicts. If property rights are conceived of merely as
the outcomes of litigation over conflicting uses of resources, they
lose both their capacity to support private productive activity and
their distinctiveness from other legal rights. 93 Most valuable uses
of resources can be the subject of rights; what distinguishes a
property right is legal rules that define objects of property and
assign control over those objects to owners in advance of
decisionmaking about resource use.
My account of property rights intersects in several ways
with that of Merrill and Smith. Property rights, as I have described
them, are based on legal things, which naturally "bundle" together
potential uses of resources. For the same reason, property rights as
I have described them tend naturally to operate in rem. Legal
things that encompass a variety of potential uses are likely to be of
interest to a variety of potential users; therefore assignment of a
legal thing to a given owner creates an indefinite number of
dutyholders.
Most importantly, both accounts emphasize the form of
property rights. For Merrill and Smith, highly determinate rights-
specifically, simple rights of exclusion that rely on the boundaries
of things to determine permissible uses-generate the information
cost benefits that support property rights. In my account,
determinacy is foundational. Highly determinate rules are the
a positivist and consequentialist account of property rights, the idea that property
rights entail and protect a range of choice does not imply that they are entirely a
matter of prerogative. The imposition of duties on owners is quite consistent
with a set of rights created for social ends. Analytically, however, it seems to me
that one must first define the minimum features of ownership-what the owner
has-before determining what duties attach.
92 See Merrill, supra note 5 (discussing the function of determinate rules in
property law); see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (noting the tension between rules and broader
standards in property law).
9 For particularly strong expression of the view that property rights are simply
the outcome of legal disputes over use of resources, see Joseph L. Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964) (Property is "the value which
each owner has left after the inconsistencies between the two competing owners
have been resolved."). See also Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of
Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that the property has no distinct meaning in
modem law).
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means by which diverse uses are bundled into legal things and
assigned to owners; without the support of determinate legal rules,
litigation-independent property rights of the kind I describe cannot
exist.94
The points that Merrill and Smith have made about
property rights and information costs are quite persuasive. I would
clarify, however, that determinate property rights do not simply
capture an information advantage associated with ownership; they
create the advantage. Fixed rights over determinate legal things
establish both the special proximity of owners to resources and the
long term interest that enables owners to make optimal choices
over time. I shall return to this point in later sections.
B. Property Rights and Property Rules
I have characterized property rights as rights that define
legal things and assign them to individual owners by means of
determinate rules. Property rules are remedies designed to prohibit
unilateral violations of rights; they stand in contrast to liability
rules, which permit rights violations upon payment of a price. True
property rules, defined in advance of litigation, must take the form
of rules. Property rule rules impose fully deterrent penalties, under
determinate conditions, for protection of determinate rights. In this
section, I take up the question what relation, if any, property rules
bear to property rights.
Despite the similarity of terms, property rules, at least as
they are employed by courts, are not coextensive with property
rights. Courts often grant prohibitive remedies at the conclusion of
litigation to protect rights that do not involve control of legally
defined things. 95 There are also instances of true property rule
protection, or something close to true property rule protection, for
non-property rights.96 Yet, as noted earlier, true property rules are
9 I am assuming that, at least within an important core of application, language
is capable of conveying determinate meaning. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT,
LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 34-89 (1992); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-
44 (1961); Schauer, supra note 8, at 53-68; Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determinacy, Objectivity, andAuthority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1993).
95 To cite just a few examples, courts frequently enjoin civil rights violations and
invasions of privacy. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 7.4(4), at 348-53; § 7.3(5),
at 326-29.
96 For example, courts routinely enter discovery orders to protect procedural
rights. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a), (b) (authorizing discovery orders and imposing
sanctions for failure to comply). They also routinely grant protective orders to
prevent domestic violence. See, e.g., JOHN DE WITT GREGORY, PETER N.
SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 221-22 (2005)
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most common in the area of property rights.
1. Some Explanations for the Use of Property Rules to
Secure Property Rights
Several commentators have offered explanations for the
convergence between property rights and property rules. Kaplow
and Shavell, for example, propose that property rules are likely to
lead to more efficient resource allocation than liability rules in
cases involving possession of physical things because of the
special values associated with things.97 Specifically, the value of a
physical thing typically has a common component, shared by both
owners and takers, and an idiosyncratic component, special to
particular individuals. Idiosyncratic value is likely to be higher for
owners than for takers, both because the owner selected the thing
for reasons of importance to him or her and because the owner has
already put the thing to use.9 8 A well-designed liability rule will
reflect both the average common value of the thing and the average
owner's idiosyncratic value.
The potential for inefficient takings arises when the actual
common value of a given thing exceeds the average common value
reflected in liability-rule damages by an amount greater than the
average owner's idiosyncratic value. In that case, takers have
reason to take, because, by taking and paying the price (average
common value plus average idiosyncratic value), they will realize
the extra common value of the thing. Given the assumption that
owners' idiosyncratic value is higher on average than takers'
idiosyncratic value, the result is inefficient because the owner's
combined value (actual common value plus his or her own,
presumptively higher, idiosyncratic value) is higher on average
than the taker's value. 99
(summarizing state statutes).
9 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 759-63. In addition to the valuation
problems discussed here, Kaplow and Shavell cite the difficulty that owners of
things face in bargaining around a liability rule when the value they place on
their property exceeds the price fixed by the rule: to protect their positions, they
must bargain with an indefinite number of potential takers. See id at 764-67.
Kaplow and Shavell also argue that when bargaining is not possible (or fails)
owners whose value exceeds the price fixed by a liability rule have reason to re-
take their property, resulting in wasteful expenditure, or to invest in excessive
precautions against takings. See id. at 767-69.
Id. at 760.
9 Id. at 761-62. Others have proposed that the problems of correlated value and
reciprocal taking identified by Kaplow and Shavell can be addressed through
refinements in liability rules. See Ayres & Goldbart, Correlated Values, supra
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Henry Smith approaches the problem from a different
angle. Smith is not primarily interested in which type of rule, as
between property rules and liability rules, will produce the most
efficient allocation of resources between parties when uses
conflict. Instead, he is concerned with the costs of gathering
information about the use and value of resources, and particularly
with the question which among possible decisionmakers can gather
and apply information about resources most effectively.10 In a
"governance" regime, government officials (courts or legislatures)
define possible uses and decide which of those uses should have
priority. In an "exclusionary" regime, officials confer rights of
exclusion on private owners, and in this way delegate the task of
identifying and choosing among possible uses to owners.101
Owners have informational advantages over official
decisionmakers, both because they are closer to the resources
encompassed by the things they own, and because their long-term
interest in those things allows them to select among present and
future uses of resources.102 Therefore, at least when there is no
strong reason to permit (and regulate) multiple uses of indivisible
resources by multiple users, a legal regime that relies on rights of
exclusion reduces information-gathering costs.
Smith links property rules to rights of exclusion and the
information cost advantages they produce. Owners of property are
entitled to exclude the world from bluntly defined things that
bundle together various uses and attributes of resources. Property
rules refer to the same blunt standard of exclusion and prohibit acts
that cross the legal boundary defined by the right.'0 3 Consequently,
note 2; Ayres & Goldbart, Optimal Delegation, supra note 5.
Keith Hylton offers another argument for property rules based on
subjective (or idiosyncratic) value. See Hylton, supra note 2, at 151-68. Hylton
argues that property rules are more effective in protecting actual subjective
values. Therefore property rules are superior to liability rules in settings in
which the costs that result from failure to protect subjective values (including
weakened incentives for productivity, costs of owner self-protection) exceed the
costs of misallocation. See id. at 167-68. Hylton, however, does not limit his
argument to takings of things: he argues that subjective values are at least as
sirificant in cases of harmful externalities. See id. at 168-70.See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1724.
ioi See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 790-99; Smith,
Exclusion, supra note 2, at 978-79; Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1755-63.
102 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 985; Smith, Property, supra note 2, at
1763.
103 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 1005 ("To implement a property rule,
courts can just monitor the rough variable-such as entry- . . . without having
to evaluate individual uses."); Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1753-54, 1758
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courts applying property rules never become involved in
identifying, comparing, and valuing particular uses of resources. A
liability rule, in contrast, requires official decisionmakers to
identify and value potential uses of resources in order to set an
accurate price for violations of the right.T 0
Much of the savings in information cost Smith cites derives
from the right of exclusion itself, which delegates the choice
among uses to owners. Yet, Smith also suggests two ways in which
deterrent property rules contribute to, or capitalize on, the
information cost benefits of exclusionary property rights. First, as
just noted, property rules preserve the delegation of
decisionmaking responsibility to owners while liability rules allow
takers to force an official valuation of the resources at stake.
Forced valuation has a number of adverse consequences. Most
obviously, officials incur the direct costs of identifying and valuing
particular uses.' 5 Further, because the valuation and transfer
occurs immediately, owners lose their ability to postpone
decisionmaking and take advantage of higher-valued opportunities
for future use. 6 Finally, the prospect that takers may force courts
to value particular uses and attributes of resources may encourage
owners or potential takers to manipulate the "signals" courts rely
on to determine value.' 07
Second, protecting exclusionary property rights with
property rules rather than liability rules avoids wasteful
maneuvering by owners and takers. One source of difficulty under
liability rules is opportunistic taking.1os Opportunism is a worry
("Because the signals used in the exclusion strategy are on/off, they are naturally
paired with property rules.").04 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 1, at 1005; Smith, Property, supra note 1, at
1758. Once rights of exclusion are in place, courts can refer to values the market
has placed on the same bluntly legal package of uses. Yet, as Smith explains, the
market measure is not an accurate measure of the value an owner places on the
package because it does not capture uses that have not yet been discovered, or
that the owner has discovered but cannot effectively communicate to the court.
See Smith, Property, supra note 2 at 1775-76.
105 Of course, even under a property rule rule, courts will have to incur the costs
of valuation in accident cases, in which deterrence is not an option.
106 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1763-64.
107 See id. at 1764-68. Smith also argues that the divided entitlement generated
by a liability rule will add to the costs incurred by third parties who wish to
acquire, or to avoid violating, a right. See id. at 1768-70; Merrill & Smith,
Optimal Standardization, supra note 5, at 26-34. As long as the underlying right
is a blunt right of exclusion from a determinately defined thing, however, a
liability rule does not appear to pose a significantly greater risk of confusion.
08 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 985-86; Smith, Property, supra note 2,
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because courts fixing prices for violation of exclusionary rights
must rely on generalizations about classes of assets. Smith
suggests, plausibly, that although owners have better information
about their own assets than takers, takers are likely to have better
information than courts about the assets they are considering
taking. As a result, takers are able to make more refined
generalizations than courts and to target assets that courts will
probably undervalue. It follows that liability rules encourage
wasteful investment by takers in information about vulnerable
assets.109 They may also discourage owners from investing in the
information that makes their assets valuable, and therefore
vulnerable."o A related form of waste occurs when owners incur
expenses to protect information they have developed about their
assets.
It is worth noting that, although Kaplow and Shavell and
Smith approach the problem of property rule protection for
property rights in quite different ways, they concur in the
assumption that courts have established true property rules,
providing for protection of determinate rights, by fully deterrent
sanctions under specified conditions. This is easiest to see in the
case of Kaplow and Shavell: Kaplow and Shavell are concerned
with inefficient takings by takers anticipating liability rules that
systematically undervalue harm in cases of common value.
Accordingly, their argument addresses the choice between a
liability rule rule and a property rule rule that will effectively deter
takings."'
The relation between Smith's argument and the prospective
effect of property rules is more complex. The primary set of
reasons Smith offers in favor of property rules relates to the
superior ability of owners, in comparison to courts, to identify and
assess particular uses of resources.1 12 It might appear, therefore,
that the benefits he attributes to property rules come into play at
the point of litigation: by adopting a property rule at the conclusion
of litigation, the court avoids the need to determine and value the
uses of assets.
Yet, Smith's arguments, like Kaplow's and Shavell's,
ultimately depend on the presence of true property rules. Only a
at 1774-85.
109 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 986; Smith, Property, supra note 2, at
1780.
110 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1785-90.
.' See id. at 1785-90.
112 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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property rule rule, providing for property rule protection in
determinate classes of cases, can deter the decision to take and
definitively prevent takers from forcing courts to engage in
valuation. More importantly, the information cost advantages
Smith associates with ownership depend in part on the presence of
true property rules. One reason why owners are superior
decisionmakers is that they can postpone decisionmaking and
speculate on future uses of the resources they control. Yet, if the
form of protection is not settled in advance, takings may occur,
courts may choose to apply liability rules, and any future uses the
owner had in mind may be preempted. Thus, in the absence of a
property rule rule, the possibility of a liability rule decision in a
particular case reduces the expected value of any future uses the
owner has in mind and undercuts the information cost advantage
on which the argument for property rules depends.' 1 3
2. The Interdependence of Property Rights, Property
Rules, and Rules
The points made by Kaplow and Shavell and by Smith help
to explain the convergence in practice between deterrent remedies
and property rights. Of course, Kaplow and Shavell and Smith
endorse property rules for quite different reasons: Kaplow and
Shavell argue that property rules, applied to property rights, will
result in fewer inefficient takings and therefore to a better
allocation of resources between owners and takers. Smith argues
that, apart from the final allocation of resources between parties,
property rules, securing exclusionary property rights, promote
efficiency by delegating decisions about the use of resources to the
party best positioned to gather and deploy relevant information.
There may, however, be common ground between the insights
these authors provide. Moreover, the combined implications of
113 This point exposes a potential difficulty in securing the information costs and
benefits that Smith associates with exclusion. As Smith recognizes, the law must
employ both exclusion and governance strategies to maximize value in different
settings. See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 790-99;
Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 981, 1024-45. Yet the respective domains of
exclusion and governance may be difficult to capture in the form of a
determinate rule. I am grateful to Eduardo Pefialver for this observation.
The second set of reasons Smith offers for property rules
unquestionably relies on true property rules. Unless intentional takings are
effectively deterred, takers will invest in information that will aid them in
spotting owners whose interests are likely to be undervalued by liability rules,
and owners will invest in preventative measures that would not be necessary
under a true property rule. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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their arguments illustrate the importance, and the creative
potential, of legal form.
Summarizing once again: Kaplow and Shavell show that
property rules are superior to standard liability rules based on
average victim harm because of the special combination of
common values and idiosyncratic values likely to accompany
possession of things. In cases of high common value, a liability
rule will result in unilateral takings although the higher
idiosyncratic value of owners makes taking inefficient. 114 Kaplow
and Shavell refer to rights to tangible things, but their argument
can easily be extended to any legal thing that supports a range of
uses and is the subject of exclusionary rights.
Smith observes that property rights operate by packaging
an indefinite number and variety of potential resource uses into a
bounded asset and giving the owner a right to exclude others from
the asset. This effectively allows the owner to choose among the
uses encompassed by the asset. Delegation of choice to the owner
is efficient because the owner has special access to information
about resource use. 15
Here I would add the point made earlier, that the
advantages of owners in gathering and processing information
about resources are not natural facts about the world.' 16 The
owner's information advantage comes from proximity to an asset
and from a continuing interest in the asset, which allows the owner
to compare present and future uses. Proximity and continuity of
interest, however, are consequences of the owner's legal right of
exclusion: they depend on the rules of law that "bundle" potential
uses into recognized legal assets and give owners the right to deny
access to others. In the terms I have used to describe property
rights, proximity and continuity of interest, and therefore access to
information, depend on legal rules that define determinate objects
of property and assign those objects to owners.
114 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. A liability rule further along
the continuum of deterrence might be optimal in theory. See Ayres & Goldbart,
Correlated Values, supra note 5, at 135-46. But the ideal liability rule rule,
capable of affecting decisions about taking, may be outside the practical
capacity of courts.
115 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Smith appears to recognize this
but does not spell out its implications. See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at
1777 ("[T]he values of the parties ... depend in part on the choice of rule that
protects the entitlement.").
7 In this respect, property rights and contract rights are parallel. The core
explanation for legal enforcement of contractual promises is reliance on the part
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The advantages owners have in identifying and evaluating
potential resource uses, which derive from determinate
exclusionary property rights, make them superior decisionmakers
in a range of cases. These advantages also help to explain the
special components of value that Kaplow and Shavell cite in
defense of property rule protection for possessory interests in
things.' A legal right to possession of a thing is, of course, a right
of exclusion. The common value (shared by owners and takers) of
a right to exclusive possession of a thing is likely to be based at
least in part on the proximity to resources the rightholder enjoys.
Similarly, the idiosyncratic value such a right holds for existing
owners is likely to be based at least in part on investments the
owner has made in the expectation of continued possession. In
other words, the values that give property rules an edge over
liability rules for purposes of resource allocation in property cases
are based on the information-based advantages that ownership
confers. These advantages, in turn, depend on the legal rules that
create exclusionary property rights.
Thus, property rules are connected to property rights in two
interrelated ways. First, property rules reinforce the delegation of
decisionmaking authority to owners that accompanies property
rights. They prevent takers from forcing courts to identify and
value uses of resources, and they ensure continuity of control for
owners. Second, given the information-based advantages that
owners derive from exclusionary property rights backed by
property rules, property rules can lead to a more efficient
allocation of resources between owners and takers. In each case,
however, the benefits of a property rule depend on its capacity to
affect decisionmaking prior to litigation. In each case, therefore,
only true property rules, embodied in determinate rules, will
operate as desired.
of promisees. Justified reliance, however, is not an exogenous fact; it depends
on the expectation that contractual promises will be enforced, which depends in
turn on legal rules providing for enforcement. The independent reason for
enforcement of contractual promises is not reliance itself, but the social value of
reliance. Reliance leads to productive investment; therefore, to capture the value
of reliance, lawmakers establish rules that define valid contracts and provide for
their enforcement. The scheme, and the value it yields, depends on legal rules
that are reasonably determinate in advance of agreement. See L.L. Fuller &
William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 63-64 (1946); Andrei Marmor, ShouldLike Cases Be TreatedAlike?, 11
LEGAL THEORY 27, 33 (2005).
118 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Property rights define legal things and assign them to
owners. As a result, owners can choose among permissible uses of
resources encompassed by the things they own, and their proximity
to and continuing interest in those things equip them to choose
efficiently. Deterrent property rules ensure the continuity that
makes property rights valuable to owners and to society. Once
property rights are securely in place, the value they generate also
makes property rules a more efficient response to the possibility of
unilateral taking. To achieve these results, however, both property
rights and property rules must be implemented by general,
determinate, and authoritative legal rules.
Coordination among decisionmakers is frequently cited as a
beneficial consequence of general, determinate, and authoritative
rules.119 The advantages of property rules identified by Kaplow
and Shavell, Smith, and others are special types of coordination
benefits associated with institution of property, which help to
explain the special connection between property rights and
determinate legal rules. Yet, because the benefits associated with
property rights and property rules derive from legal rules, they
depend on the ability of courts to establish and maintain rules.
A rule-based body of law faces two significant obstacles.
First, determinate rules are naturally overinclusive and
underinclusive, and it is difficult and possibly irrational for courts
to apply them when the outcomes they prescribe appear contrary to
the purposes of the rules, or simply unfair. Second, when judges
themselves act as rulemakers, as they often do in the case of basic
property rights and remedial rules, they are prone to make
mistakes. Judges make rules in the context of adjudication, and
their choice of rules may be affected by the facts of the cases
before them. The facts of particular cases, however, are not always
representative of the majority of cases that will be governed by the
rule. When judge-made rules are influenced by the facts of
unregresentative cases, they may not perform well over the long
run.
Both property rights and property rules are vulnerable to
119 See supra note 65.
120 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 883
(2006); see also Rachlinski, supra note 72 (noting different cognitive defects
affecting judicial and legislative rulemaking). Schauer points out that the same
case-specific biases that lead judges to craft less-than-optimal rules can also lead
them to overrule sound rules. Schauer, supra, at 910-12.
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problems of this kind. Property rights implicate questions of
distributive justice, and their distributive consequences in
particular cases may lead judges to make exceptions to rules or to
announce unsound rules. Property rules come into focus at the
remedial stage of litigation, when judges are especially likely to
focus on the factual details of the cases before them.
Judges do appear to recognize the importance of rules in
the area of property. Yet, particularly when it comes to remedies,
there will never be perfect adherence to rules. This is a fact of legal
life, which casts a shadow over enterprise of predicting the effects
of remedial choice.
